TABLE OF CONTENTS
|Nicholas Griffin||“Russell’s Neutral
Monist Theory of Desire”|
ABSTRACT: Russell’s theory of desire in The Analysis of Mind
is subject to a seemingly overwhelming objection, apparently stated first
by Wittgenstein and subsequently elaborated even more compellingly by Anthony
Kenny. The puzzle is that, before he became a neutral monist, Russell had
used essentially the same argument as part of a critique of William
James’s theory of knowledge. Since Russell had already formulated
the argument as part of his case against generally naturalistic, and
specifically neutral monist, theories of propositional attitudes, why did
he think his own neutral monist theory of desire was exempt? I canvass
various suggestions, but argue that none of them are effective.
|Richard McDonough||“Monk on Russell’s Heart of
ABSTRACT: The paper argues that Russell’s fascination with
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness reveals a positive aspect of
Russell’s character neglected by Monk’s biography.
Section 1 sketches some of the darker aspects of Russell’s character.
§2 outlines the relevant themes in Heart of Darkness.
§3 argues that Russell’s fascination both with Conrad and
his novel derives from his resolute commitment to a painful exercise
in self-knowledge. §4 explains the more positive perspective on
Russell’s “strength of mind” that emerges from this
|Andrew Lugg||“Russell and Wittgenstein on
Incongruent Counterparts and Incompatible Colours”|
ABSTRACT: Russell (in Principles of Mathematics) and
Wittgenstein (in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) largely
agree on the twin questions of why pairs of congruent objects
cannot always be made to coincide and why surfaces can never be
uniformly two colours at once. Both philosophers take space and
colour to be mathematically representable, construe the relevant
impossibilities as mathematical and hold that mathematical
impossibility is at root logical. It is not by chance that Russell
says nothing about the phenomena in his Introduction to the
Tractatus or surprising that Wittgenstein was unmoved by
the objection that his account of colour incompatibility puts
paid to his early philosophy.
|Rebecca Keller and Jonathan Westphal||“What Does
Russell’s Argument against Naive Realism Prove?”|
ABSTRACT: We provide a study of Russell’s argument (in
An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth) against naive realism
in which we distinguish five different forms of the argument.
We agree with McLendon’s (1956) criticism, that
Russell’s premiss that naive realism leads to physics
(our emphasis) is ambiguous as between “leads historically
or psychologically” and “leads logically”.
However, physics does logically lead to naive realism, in the
sense that it presupposes it. In that case it is physics that is
false. There is also the possibility that physics and naive realism
are compatible, and that possibility obtains if phenomenalism is true.
|Kenneth Blackwell||“Russell’s Personal
|Graham Stevens||Review of Nicholas Griffin and Bernard
Linsky, eds., The Palgrave Centenary Companion to Principia
|Patrick Deane||Review of Robert Colls,
George Orwell: English Rebel|
|Chris Pincock||Review of William Demopoulos,
Logicism and Its Philosophical Legacy|
|Sheila Turcon||Review of Constance Malleson,
The Coming Back|