Russell. N.s. Vol. 23, no. 1. Summer 2003



Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies is published by The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster University. For ordering information, including prices, see the back issues table.


TABLE OF CONTENTS
Editor's Notes
Graham Stevens"Re-examining Russell's Paralysis: Ramified Type-Theory and Wittgenstein's Objection to Russell's Theory of Judgment"
ABSTRACT: It is well known that Russell abandoned his multiple-relation theory of judgment, which provided the philosophical foundations for PM 's ramified type-theory, in response to criticisms by Wittgenstein. Their exact nature has remained obscure. An influential interpretation, put forth by Sommerville and Griffin, is that Wittgenstein showed that the theory must appeal to the very hierarchy it is intended to generate and thus collapses into circularity. I argue that this rests on a mistaken interpretation of type-theory and suggest an alternative one to explain Russell's reaction.
Rosalind Carey"The Development of Russell's Diagrams for Judgment"
ABSTRACT: In his 1918 lectures, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Russell discusses the impossibility of drawing a diagram or "map-in-space" of the form of belief (judgment). In this paper, I argue that an examination of diagrams appended to Russell's Theory of Knowledge shows him already anticipating this symbolizing difficulty in 1913 and—in the midst of attempting to adopt Wittgenstein's doctrine of propositional bipolarity—jettisoning attempts to diagram the form of belief.
Nadine Faulkner"Russell and Vagueness"
ABSTRACT: In this paper I present the philosophical backdrop to Russell's 1923 "Vagueness" paper. I argue that his view of vagueness in 1923 is the result of a rise in the importance of symbolism in his thinking coupled with a new interest in psychology. I show how these new interests are related to concerns he had with his theory of judgment as well as his logicist project. I attend to the two major complaints against his view of vagueness: that all language is vague and his purported conflation of vagueness with generality. I lastly show how Russell's view is distinct from modern approaches to vagueness in so far as he is not concerned with truth-value gaps but instead sees vagueness as applying primarily to what is cognitive and as a transitory position between ignorance and knowledge.
Ian Watson"Mollie, Countess Russell"
William BruneauReview of Chris Shute, Bertrand Russell: "Education as the Power of Independent Thought"
Chad TrainerReview of David Edmonds and John Eidinow, Wittgenstein's Poker: the Story of a Ten-Minute Argument between Two Great Philosophers
Stefan AnderssonReview of Dave Robinson and Judy Groves, Introducing Bertrand Russell
Timothy MadiganReview of Ray Monk, Bertrand Russell, [Vol. 2:] The Ghost of Madness, 1921–1970
Peter StoneReview of Ray Monk, Bertrand Russell, [Vol. 2:] The Ghost of Madness, 1921–1970
Deborah GorhamReview of Harriet Ward, A Man of Small Importance: My Father Griffin Barry


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